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We study the effect of the life settlement market on the structure of long term contracts offered by
the primary market for life insurance, as well as the effect on consumer welfare, using a dynamic model
of life insurance with one sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation. We show that the presence
of life settlement affects the extent as well as the form of dynamic reclassification risk insurance in
the equilibrium of the primary insurance market, and that the settlement market generally leads to
lower consumer welfare. We also examine the primary insurers' response to the settlement market















A life settlement is a ﬁnancial transaction in which a policyholder sells his/her life insurance
policy to a third party – the life settlement ﬁrm – for more than the cash value offered by the
policy itself. The life settlement ﬁrm subsequently assumes responsibility for all future premium
payments to the life insurance company, and becomes the new beneﬁciary of the life insurance
policy if the original policyholder dies within the coverage period.1 The life settlement industry
is quite recent, growing from just a few billion dollars in the late 1990s to about $12-$15 billion in
2007, and according to some projections, is expected to grow to more than $150 billion in the next
decade (see Chandik, 2008).2
To provide some background information on the life insurance market, the main categories of
life insurance products are Term Life Insurance and Whole Life Insurance.3 A term life insurance
policy covers a person for a speciﬁc duration at a ﬁxed or variable premium for each year. If the
person dies during the coverage period, the life insurance company pays the face amount of the
policy to his/her beneﬁciaries, provided that the premium payment has never lapsed. The most
popular type of term life insurance has a ﬁxed premium during the coverage period and is called
Level Term Life Insurance. A whole life insurance policy, on the other hand, covers a person’s
entire life, usually at a ﬁxed premium. Besides the difference in the period of coverage, term and
whole life insurance policies also differ in the amount of cash surrender value (CSV) received if
the policyholder surrenders the policy to the insurance company before the end of the coverage
period. For term life insurance, the CSV is zero; for whole life insurance, the CSV is typically
positive and pre-speciﬁed to depend on the length of time that the policyholder has owned the
policy. Importantly, the CSV on whole life policies does not depend on the health status of the
policyholder when surrendering the policy.4
The opportunity for the life settlement market results from two main features of life insurance
contracts. First, most life insurance policies purchased by consumers, either term or whole life,
have the feature that the insurance premium stays ﬁxed over the course of the policy. Because pol-
1The legal basis for the life settlement market seems to be the Supreme Court ruling in Grigsby v. Russell [222 U.S.
149, 1911], which upheld that for life insurance an “insurable interest” only needs to be established at the time the
policy becomes effective, but does not have to exist at the time the loss occurs. The life insurance industry has typically
included a two-year contestability period during which transfer of the life insurance policy will void the insurance.
2The life settlement industry actively targets wealthy seniors 65 years of age and older with life expectancies from 2
to up to 12-15 years. This differs from the earlier viatical settlement market developed during the 1980s in response to
the AIDS crisis, which targeted persons in the 25-44 age band diagnosed with AIDS with life expectancy of 24 months
or less. The viatical market largely evaporated after medical advances dramatically prolonged the life expectancy of an
AIDS diagnosis.
3There are other variations such as Universal Life Insurance and Variable Life Insurance that combine some features
of both Term and Whole Life Insurances (see Gilbert and Schultz, 1994).
4The life insurance industry typically thinks of the CSV from the whole life insurance as a form of tax-advantaged
investment instrument (see Gilbert and Schultz, 1994).
1icyholders’ health typically deteriorates over time, the ﬁxed premium implies that policyholders
initially pay a premium that is higher than actuarially fair, but in later years the same premium is
typically actuarially favorable. This phenomenon is known as front-loading. Front-loading implies
that policyholders of long-term life insurance policies, especially those with impaired health, often
have locked in premiums that are much more favorable than what they could obtain in the spot
market. This generates what has been known as the actuarial value of the life insurance policy (see
the Deloitte Report, 2005). Second, as we mentioned earlier, the cash surrender value for life insur-
ance policies is either zero for term life insurance, or at a level that does not depend on the health
status of the policyholder. Because the actuarial value of a life insurance policy is much higher
for individuals with impaired health, the fact that the CSV does not respond to health status pro-
vides an opening for the gains of trade between policyholders with impaired health and the life
settlement companies.5 Life settlement ﬁrms operate by offering policyholders, who are intending
to either lapse or surrender their life insurance policies, more cash than the cash surrender value
offered by the insurers.
The emerging life settlement market has triggered controversies between life insurance com-
panies who oppose it, and the life settlement industry who supports it. The views from the two
opposing camps are represented by Doherty and Singer (2002) and Singer and Stallard (2005) on
the proponent side, and the Deloitte Report (2005) on the opponent side. Doherty and Singer
(2002) argued that a secondary market for life insurance enhances the liquidity to life insurance
policyholders by eroding the monopsony power of the carrier. This will increase the surplus of
policyholders and in the long run will lead to a larger primary insurance market. On the other
side, life insurance companies, as represented by the Deloitte Report (2005), claim that the life
settlement market, by denying them the return on lapsing or surrendered policies, increases the
costs of providing policies in the primary market. They allege that these costs will have be passed
on to consumers, which would ultimately make the consumers worse off.
A key issue in the contention between the opposing sides is the role of lapsing or surrendering
in the pricing of life insurance in the primary market (see Daily, 2004). There are a variety of
situations in which policyholders may choose to lapse or surrender. First, the beneﬁciary for
whomthepolicywasoriginallypurchasedcouldbedeceasedornolongerneedthepolicy; second,
the policyholder may experience a negative income shock (or a large expense shock) that leads
5The Deloitte Report (2005, p. 3) states that the CSVs of whole life insurance policies are, by regulation, not allowed
to be conditioned on health impairments of the policyholder who surrenders the policy. Doherty and Singer (2002, p.
18) also argue that regulatory constraints faced by life insurance carriers deter life insurance companies from offering
health dependent cash surrender values: “Such an offering of explicit health-dependent surrender values by a life
insurance carrier, however, would be fraught with regulatory, actuarial, and administrative difﬁculties. Life insurance
carriers do not offer health-adjusted surrender values, which suggests that these difﬁculties outweigh the beneﬁts that
carriers would obtain by offering health-dependent surrender values to consumers.” Life settlement ﬁrms so far are not
yet regulated in their pricing of life insurance policies.
2him to favor more cash now than to leave a bequest.6 In the absence of the life settlement market,
when a health-impaired policyholder chooses to lapse or surrender its policy, the life insurance
company pockets the intrinsic economic value of these policies, which potentially allows the life
insurance company to offer insurance at a lower premium. In the presence of the life settlement
market, these policies will be purchased by the life settlement ﬁrms as assets, thus the primary
insurance company will always have to pay their face amount if the original policyholder dies
within the coverage period.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of life settlement on the primary life insurance market.
Using a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance similar to Hendel and Lizzeri (2003, HL
henceforth) and Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008, DHL henceforth), we study how equilibrium
contracts and consumer welfare are affected by the presence of a life settlements market. We focus
on how the equilibrium properties of the life insurance contracts and the consumer welfare are
affected by life settlement ﬁrms in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance as in . Hendel
and Lizzeri (2003) studied a model where life insurance companies are risk neutral and can com-
mit to contractual terms (including future premiums and face amounts), and the consumers are
risk averse and cannot commit to remain in the contract they earlier have chosen. Consumers are
subject to mortality risk, which is assumed to be symmetrically observed by the consumers and
the life insurance company. Because consumers’ mortality risks may change over time, they will
face reclassiﬁcation risk (i.e., changes in insurance premiums) if they have to purchase one-period
contracts from the spot market. HL showed that the competitive life insurance market will in
equilibrium offer long-term life insurance policies that at least partially insure the policyholders
against the reclassiﬁcation risk, via front-loading of insurance premiums. In a recent paper, Daily,
Hendel and Lizzeri (2008) further assumed that consumers in the second period may lose bequest
motive, and introduced the life settlement market. They compared the consumer welfare with
and without the life settlement market.
In this paper, we ﬁrst fully characterize the equilibrium life insurance contract in the presence
of a settlement market, assuming that the primary insurers cannot enrich their contract space
to set optimally chosen cash surrender values. We show that the life settlement market affects
the equilibrium life insurance contracts in a qualitatively important manner: with the settlement
market, risk reclassiﬁcation insurance will be offered in the form of premium discounts, rather than
in the form of ﬂat premiums, as is the case without a settlement market. This may lead to a smaller
degree of front-loading in the ﬁrst period. We also show a general welfare result that the presence
of the settlement market always leads to a decrease of consumer welfare relative to what could be
achieved in the absence of the settlement market. Moreover, we provide conditions under which
6For example, Wall Street Journal reports that older adults are turning to the “life settlement” industry to help them
through tough times in an article titled “Source of Cash for Seniors are Drying Up” (November 13, 2008).
3the life settlement market could lead to a complete collapse of reclassiﬁcation risk insurance as a
result of unraveling. We then relax the assumption that prohibits endogenously chosen CSVs, and
ﬁnd that whether or not CSVs can be made health-contingent has crucial implications. If the cash
surrender values are restricted to be non-health-contingent, we show that endogenous CSV is an
ineffective tool for the primary insurance companies to counter the threat of the life settlement
industry.
Our paper is also related to a large industrial organization literature on secondary markets for
durable goods (see, e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999; Stolyarov, 2002; House and Leahy, 2004). The
key difference between the life settlement market and the secondary market for durable goods
is as follows. In the durable good case, once the transaction between the primary seller and the
buyer is consummated, the seller’s payoff is not directly affected by whether the buyer sells the
used durable in the secondary market. In contrast, for the case of life settlements, the primary
insurer’s payoff is directly impacted by whether the policyholder chooses to lapse, surrender for
cash value, or to sell the contract to a settlement ﬁrm.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a baseline model
without the life settlement market. In Section 3 we extend the baseline model to include the life
settlement market and analyze its effect on primary market contracts and on consumer welfare.
In Section 4 we consider how the welfare results are affected if the life insurance companies can
respond to life settlements by specifying endogenous cash surrender values in the life insurance
contract; in particular we show that whether health-contingent CSVs are allowed has a crucial
effect. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses directions for future research. All
proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Baseline Model of Life Insurance without Settlement Market
In this section, we present and analyze a model of dynamic life insurance slightly modiﬁed
from Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) and Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008).8
7Other secondary markets in ﬁnancial services, such as the home mortgages resale market and the catastrophic
risk reinsurance, operates more like the secondary market for durable goods (see Doherty and Singer, 2002 for some
description of these markets).
8The two main modiﬁcations are as follows. First, we consider a continuous distribution for second-period health
states while HL and DHL considered discrete health states. Second, we slightly change the timing of events: we
assume that income realization and premium payments occur before the resolution of death uncertainty, while HL and
DHL assumed that income and consumption are realized after the death uncertainty is resolved. Neither modiﬁcation
makes any qualitative difference for this baseline model without the life settlement market; but they simplify some of
our arguments when we introduce the life settlement market.
42.1 The Model
Health, Income and Bequest Motives. Consider a perfectly competitive primary market for life
insurance that includes individuals (policyholders) and life insurance companies. There are two
periods. In the ﬁrst period, the policyholder has a probability of death p1 2 (0;1) known to both
himself and the insurance companies. In the second period, the policyholder has a new probabil-
ity of death p2 2 [0;1] which is randomly drawn from a continuous and differential cumulative
distribution function () with a corresponding density (). A consumer’s period 2 health state
p2 is not known in period 1, but p2 is symmetrically learned by the insurance company and the
consumer, and thus common knowledge, at the start of period 2.
The policyholder’s income stream is y   g in period 1 and y + g in period 2, where y is inter-
preted as the mean life-cycle income and g 2 (0;  g] with  g < y captures the income growth over
the periods. Both y and g are assumed to be common knowledge.
The policyholder has two sources of utility: his own consumption should he live, and his
dependents’ consumption should he die. If the policyholder lives, he derives utility u(c) if he
consumes c  0; if he dies, then he has a utility v(c) if his dependents consume c  0. u() and
v () are both strictly concave and twice differentiable.
However, in period 2, there is a chance that the policyholder no longer has a bequest motive.
We denote by q 2 (0;1) the probability that the policyholder loses his bequest motive.9 The
bequest motive is realized at the same time as the period 2 health state; however, we assume that
it is private information to the policyholder and cannot be contracted upon. If the policyholder
retains his bequest motive, his utility in period 2 is again u() if he is alive and v() if he dies; if
the policyholder loses bequest motive, then his utility is u() if he stays alive, and some constant
which is normalized to zero if he dies.
We assume that there are no capital markets, thus the consumer cannot transfer income from
period 1 to period 2. The only way for the consumer to ensure a stream of income for his depen-
dents is to purchase life insurance.10
Timing, Commitment, and Contracts. Now we provide more details about the timing of events.
At the beginning period 1, after learning the period-1 health state p1, the consumer may pur-
chase a long-term contract from an insurance company. A long-term contract speciﬁes a premium
and face value for period 1, hQ1;F1i, and a menu of health-contingent premiums and face values
hQ2(p2);F2(p2)i for each period-2 health state p2 2 [0;1]. In contrast, a spot contract is simply a
9A loss of bequest motive could result from divorce, or from changes in the circumstances of the intended beneﬁcia-
ries of the life insurance policy.
10Studying how access to capital markets might affect the demand for life insurance and the welfare effect of life
settlement is an important area for future research.
5premium and a face value hQ;Fi which earns zero expected proﬁt for a given coverage period.
The key assumption is that the insurance companies can commit to these terms in period 2, but
that the policyholders cannot. The one-sided commitment assumption has two important implica-
tions. First, it implies that the period-2 terms of the long-term insurance contract must be at least
as desirable to the policyholder as what he could obtain in the period-2 spot market; otherwise,
the policyholder will lapse the long-term contract into a new spot contract. This imposes a con-
straint on the set of feasible long term contracts that consumers will demand in period 1. Second,
if a policyholder suddenly ﬁnds himself without a bequest motive, he could lapse his policy by
refusing to pay the second period premium.
In period 2, after learning the period 2 health state p2, the policyholder has three options. He
can either continue with his long-term contract purchased in period 1, or he can let the long-term
policy lapse and buy a period-2 spot contract, or he can let the long-term policy lapse and simply
remain uninsured.
2.2 Equilibrium Contracts
To characterize the equilibrium set of contracts, we ﬁrst consider the actions of a policyholder
in the second period who no longer has a bequest motive. Given the absence of secondary market,
and we have not yet allowed the insurance companies to buy back contracts through CSVs, the
best course of action for those who no longer have a bequest motive is to simply let the long-term
policy lapse and become uninsured.11
Competition among primary insurance companies ensures that the equilibrium contract is a
long-term contract h(Q1;F1);(Q2(p2);F2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]i that solves:



















s.t. Q1   p1F1 + (1   p1)(1   q)
Z
[Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)]d(p2) = 0; (2)
Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)  0; for all p2 2 [0;1]; (3)
where (1) is the expected utility the policyholders receive from the contract, (2) is the zero-proﬁt
constraint that reﬂects perfect competition in the primary market, and constraints (3) guarantee
that there will not be lapsation among policyholders with a bequest motive in the second period.12
11We introduce “cash surrender value” in Section 4 when we consider the primary life insurers’ response to the
settlement market.
12See Hendel and Lizzeri (2003, Appendix) for a formal argument for why (3) guarantee “no lapsation” for those
6The ﬁrst order conditions for problem (1) with respect to Q1;F1;Q2(p2) and F2(p2) are, respec-
tively:
u0(y   g   Q1) = ; (4a)
v0(F1) = ; (4b)
u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
; (4c)
v0(F2(p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
; (4d)
where  and (p2) are respectively the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2) and (3), and  > 0
and (p2)  0 must also satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
(p2)[Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)] = 0: (5)
Notice that the ﬁrst order conditions (4) imply that:
u0 (y   g   Q1) = v0 (F1); (6a)
u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) = v0 (F2 (p2)) for all p2 2 [0;1]: (6b)
Thus in equilibrium a policyholder obtains full-event insurance in every state in both periods. (6a)-
(6b) also imply that there is a one-to-one relationship between the face amounts (F1 and F2 (p2);
respectively) and premiums (Q1 and Q2 (p2); respectively) policyholders will obtain in equilib-
rium; thus it sufﬁces to characterize the equilibrium premiums Q1 and Q2(p2) for all p2 2 [0;1].
Moreover, because u0 and v0 are decreasing, the face amounts must decrease with the premium in
every state in both periods.
To characterize the equilibrium premiums, it is useful to divide the support of the second-
period health states p2 into two subsets B and NB depending on whether the no-lapsation con-
straint (3) binds. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If p2 2 B and p0
2 2 NB then p2 < p0
2 and Q2(p2)  Q2(p0
2).
Lemma 1 implies the existence of a threshold p
2 such that p2 2 B if p2 < p
2 and p2 2 NB if
p2 > p
2. To characterize the equilibrium premiums Q2 (p2), it is useful to deﬁne the fair premium
and face amount for full-event insurance under health state p2 in the second period, denoted by
with bequest motives in the second period.
7QFI
2 (p2) and FFI
2 (p2), which uniquely solve the following pair of equations:
QFI
2 (p2)   p2FFI
2 (p2) = 0; (7)
u0  








where (7) ensures that the premium is actuarially fair, and (8) ensures full-event insurance as
deﬁned earlier.13
From Lemma 1, we have that for all p2 < p
2; (3) is binding; together with the full-event insur-
ance conditions (6b), we must have Q2 (p2) = QFI
2 (p2) for all p2 < p
2: If p2 > p
2; then we know
from Lemma 1 that p2 2 NB; thus (p2) = 0: Therefore the ﬁrst order conditions (4a) and (4c)
imply that:
u0(y   g   Q1) = u0 (y + g   Q2(p2)): (9)
Equation (9) implies that if p2 > p
2; the premium Q2 (p2) must be independent of p2; moreover, it
must satisfy
Q2 (p2) = 2g + Q1: (10)
Finally, the following lemma characterizes the equilibrium premium for p2 = p
2 if p
2 < 1 :
Lemma 2. If p











= u0 (y   g   Q1): (12)
Lemma 2 implies that the threshold p
2 is uniquely determined by the following equation:
QFI
2 (p
2) = 2g + Q1: (13)
Summarizing the above discussions, we have shown that in the baseline model, the equilib-
rium premium proﬁle over period-2 health states follows the increasing actuarially fair premium
proﬁle QFI





 1 (2g + Q1), but remains constant at Q1 + 2g for
p2 > p
2: Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium premiums in the second period as a function of the
period-2 health state p2:14
The remaining element of the equilibrium long-term contract, i.e. the ﬁrst period premium Q1
(and thus also F1); is determined from the zero proﬁt condition (2). Since we have shown that for
13The equation system (7) and (8) has a unique solution because u
0 and v
0 are both decreasing in their arguments.
14Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) made the ingeneous observation that excatly the same outcome for the consumers would











Figure 1: Equilibrium Period-2 Premium Proﬁle Q2 (p2): The No Life Settlement Market Case.
all p2  p
2; Q2 (p2) = p2F2 (p2); (2) can now be rewritten as:




[Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)]d(p2) = 0: (14)
Because Q2 (p2) < p2F2(p2) for all p2 > p
2; the second term in the left hand side of (14) is negative,
i.e., the insurance company in equilibrium will for sure suffer a loss in the second period; thus,
the zero-proﬁt condition (14) requires that Q1   p1F1 > 0: In other words, the insurance company
demands in the ﬁrst period a premium Q1 that is higher than the actuarially fair premium p1F1
for the period-1 coverage alone. This is exactly the phenomenon of front-loading. In equilibrium,
consumers accept a front loaded premium in exchange for reclassiﬁcation risk insurance. This reclas-
siﬁcation risk insurance takes the form of ﬂat premiums in the second period for all health states
p2 > p
2:
Two useful observations are in order. First, one can show that p
2 will always be greater than p1,
the period-1 death probability. To see this, suppose to the contrary that p
2 < p1, hence p1 2 NB:
From (10), we have Q2(p1) = Q1 + 2g: The ﬁrst order conditions (6a) and (6b) then imply that if
Q2 (p1) = Q1 + 2g; it must be the case that F2 (p1) = F1: Since by assumption p1 2 NB; we have
Q2 (p1)   p1F2 (p1) = (Q1 + 2g)   p1F1 < 0; hence Q1   p1F1 <  2g < 0. This contradicts the
zero-proﬁt constraint, which requires that Q1   p1F1 is positive whenever p
2 < 1.
One can also show that when g is sufﬁciently small, then p
2 < 1; i.e., there must be some degree
9of reclassiﬁcation risk insurance and front-loading in equilibrium. To see this, suppose that p
2 = 1,
thatis, supposethatno-lapsationconstraint(3)bindsforallp2, thenﬁrstorderconditions(4)imply
that u0 (y + g   Q2 (p2))  u0 (y   g   Q1) for all p2 2 [0;1). Since u is concave, this in turn implies
that Q2(p2)  Q1 + 2g for all p2. However, for any p > p1; it must be the case that Q2(p2) > Q1 if
p2 2 B.15 Thus when g is sufﬁciently small, it is impossible to have both Q2(p2)  Q1 + 2g for all
p2 and Q2 (p2) > Q1 for all p2 > p1:
The above discussions are summarized below, which replicates Parts 1-3 of Proposition 1 in
Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) with some slight modiﬁcations.
Proposition 1. (Hendel and Lizzeri 2003) The equilibrium set of contracts satisﬁes the following:
1. All policyholders obtain full event insurance in period 1, and in all period-2 health states as deﬁned
by (6);
2. There is a period-2 threshold health state p
2 (which is higher than the period 1 death probability p1)
such that for all p2  p
2 the period-2 premiums are actuarially fair, and for all p2 > p
2 the period-2
premiums are constant, actuarially favorable and given by Q2(p2) = Q2 (p
2) = Q1 + 2g;
3. Whentheincomegrowthparameterg issufﬁcientlysmall, p
2 isstrictlylessthan1, i.e. reclassiﬁcation
risk insurance is provided for policyholders with low income growth.
The following proposition provides a comparative statics result about how the probability of
bequest motive loss q affects the contract proﬁle, front-loading and reclassiﬁcation risk insurance:
Proposition 2. Let ^ q > q: Let unhatted and hatted variables denote equilibrium for q and ^ q respectively.
Suppose that p
2 < 1: Then in equilibrium ^ Q1 < Q1 and ^ p
2 < p
2.
Proposition 2 states that as the probability of losing bequest motive increases from q to ^ q; the
ﬁrst period premium will be lower, which implies that there will be less front-loading in the ﬁrst
period in equilibrium.16 At the same time, however, a higher degree of reclassiﬁcation risk is
offered in the second period, i.e., more states are offered actuarially favorable contract terms and
premiums are lower across the board. The intuition is quite simple. In the current setting without
a settlement market, policyholders who lose bequest motives in period 2 will lapse their policy,
15To see this, note that under the hypothesis that the set NB is empty, it must be the case that (Q1;F1) is actuarially
fair, i.e. Q1   p1F1 = 0. Because (Q1;F1) and (Q2 (p2);F2 (p2)) must both provide full-event insurance as deﬁned by
(6a) and (6b), if Q2 (p2)  Q1; it must be that F2 (p2) > F1 for any g > 0: But then for all p2 > p1;
Q2 (p2)   p2F2 (p2) < Q1   p2F1 < Q1   p1F1 = 0;
contradicting the assumption p2 2 B.
16Because period-one premium Q1 is lower and period-one face amount F1 (from full-event insurance condition) is
higher, the amount of front-loading, namely Q1   p1F1; must be lower.
10which results in a net proﬁt for the life insurance companies; because the life insurance companies
are competitive, they are able to pass these proﬁts onto consumers in the form of lower ﬁrst period
premiumsandahigherdegreeofreclassiﬁcationriskinsurance. Wecallthisphenomenonlapsation
based pricing.
3 Introducing the Life Settlement Market
We now introduce the life settlement market. Policyholders who lose bequest motive in period
2 can now sell their contracts to life settlement ﬁrms. If a policyholder with period-2 death prob-
ability p2 sells her policy to a life settlement ﬁrm, the life settlement ﬁrm will pay her premium to
the life insurance company and collect the death beneﬁt if the policyholder dies.
We now specify the amount that the policyholder receives from the settlement ﬁrm when she
sells her policy. To this end, we introduce the concept of the actuarial value of a life insurance
policy. Suppose that a policyholder purchased a long-term life insurance policy in period 1 that
speciﬁes a premium Q2 (p2) for a death beneﬁt of F2 (p2) if her period-2 health state realization is
p2: Then the actuarial value of the contract at health state p2 is V2 (p2)  p2F2(p2)   Q2(p2): As an
example, recall from Proposition 1 that in the equilibrium without a secondary market, the long-
term policies are such that in period-2, the actuarial values V2 (p2)  p2F2(p2)   Q2(p2) is strictly
positive for p2 > p
2: If policyholders with period-2 health states p2 > p
2 lose bequest motive, they
will prefer to capture some of the positive actuarial value rather than let the policy lapse. This,
as we described in the introduction, is the source of surplus for the life settlement market. We
assume that a policyholder will receive a fraction  2 (0;1) of the actuarial value of the policy if
she sells her life insurance policy to the settlement ﬁrm, where  < 1 represents either the degree
of competition in the secondary market or the amount of fees/commissions/proﬁts etc. that are
spent by settlement ﬁrms.17
We assume that the secondary market only operates in period 2.18 We also assume that pol-
icyholders make their decisions about whether to sell a contract on the secondary market after
learning the realization of period-2 health state and bequest motive, but before the realization of
the death uncertainty. Finally, we make the natural assumption that the resale price of the contract
is paid to the policyholder upon transfer of the policy to the settlement company and before the
death uncertainty is realized.
17Currently the life settlement industry typically offers about 20% of the death beneﬁts to sellers after commissions
and fees. Since  is relative to the actuarial value, the plausible range of  is 0.4 to 0.6 (see Life Insurance Settlement
Association (2006)).
18This is an innocuous assumption because the zero-proﬁt condition on the primary market ensures that all period 1
contracts are actuarially fair, and thus there is no surplus to be recovered on a secondary market for period 1 contracts.
113.1 Equilibrium Contracts With Settlement Market
Now we characterize the equilibrium contract in the presence of the secondary market. To
start, we note that in period 2 a policyholder will sell her contract to the settlement ﬁrm if and only





2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi
to solve:20






























2(p2)]d(p2) = 0 (16)
Qs
2(p2)   p2Fs
2(p2)  0 for all p2 2 [0;1]; (17)
where V s
2 (p2)  p2Fs
2 (p2)   Q2 (p2) is the actuarial value of the contract in period 2 for a policy-
holder with health status p2. Note that there are two key differences between the problems with
and without the settlement market. First, the consumer’s expected utility functions (1) and (15)
differ in that, for the case with the secondary market, the term V s
2 (p2) enters in (15), reﬂecting
the added amount of consumption from selling the policy to the settlement ﬁrm when the policy-
holder no longer has bequest motive. Second, the zero-proﬁt condition for the insurance company




2(p2)]d(p2) in (16). The 1 q term
is no longer in the zero proﬁt condition because when there is a secondary market, no policyhold-
ers with a positive actuarial value will let their contracts lapse, and the insurance companies are
liable for paying the death beneﬁts for all policies in the second period and of course also collect
all contracted second-period premiums.
It is useful to emphasize that the problem without settlement market does not correspond to
a special case of the problem with settlement ﬁrms by setting  = 0. Setting  = 0 would have
restored the objective function in problem (15) to be identical to that in (1), but the zero proﬁt
condition (16) would still be different from that of (2). Put it differently, even if policyholders
are selling their policies for free, the primary insurer is still liable for every policy sold to the
settlement market, thus 1   q does not enter the zero proﬁt constraint.
Similar to the case without the secondary market, the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimum
19If a policyholder still has bequest motive, she will never sell her original policy and repurchase on the spot mar-
ket because the best she could do if she sells is to get the full actuarial value of her original contract, but she will
subsequently repurchase a spot contract with the same face amount.
20We use superscript s to denote the contract terms for the secondary market case.
12with respect to Qs
1;Fs
1;Qs
2 (p2) and Fs
2 (p2) are respectively as follows:
u0(y   g   Qs
1) =  (18a)
v0(Fs
1) =  (18b)
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s





2(p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s




where, again,   0 is the Lagrange multipliers for (16) and (p2)  0 is the Lagrange multi-




2(p2)] = 0: (19)
From the ﬁrst order conditions (18), we immediately have:
u0(y   g   Qs
1) = v0(Fs
1) (20)
u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) = v0(Fs
2(p2)) for all p2 2 [0;1]: (21)





2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi must provide full-event insurance in both periods
and in all health states. Denote the set of states for which the no-lapsation constraints bind and
do not bind respectively as Bs and NBs. Lemma 3 is an analog of Lemma 1 for the case with
secondary market:
Lemma 3. If p2 2 Bs and p0





As in the case without a secondary market, Lemma 3 below shows that there exists a threshold
period-2 health state ps
2 2 [0;1] such that p2 2 Bs if p2 < ps
2 ; and p2 2 NBs if p2 > ps
2 : The
threshold period-2 health state ps
2 is characterized by Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. If ps




2 ) = QFI
2 (ps
2 ) (22)
(1   q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (ps
2 )) + qu0(y + g) = u0(y   g   Qs
1): (23)
Recall from Lemma 2 that, in the case without a settlement market, the threshold p
2 does not
depend on q, the probability of bequest motive loss. In contrast, Lemma 4 shows when there is
a settlement market, ps
2 is related to both both  and q. This fact plays an important role for the










Figure 2: Equilibrium Period-2 Premium Proﬁle Qs
2 (p2): The Life Settlement Market Case.
Lemmas 3 and 4 establish that the equilibrium contract with a secondary market has some
resemblance to that without the secondary market. Proposition 3 shows, however, that the sec-
ondary market also leads to an important qualitative difference in the way the primary insurance
market provides reclassiﬁcation risk insurance to the consumers.
Proposition 3. (Period-2 Premium at Non-binding Health States) In the presence of the life settlement
market, for p2 > ps
2 ; the second-period premium Qs
2 (p2) is such that:
1. Qs
2 (p2) < QFI
2 (p2);
2. Qs
2 (p2) is strictly increasing in p2 when q > 0:
Proposition 3 shows that with the life settlement market, reclassiﬁcation risk insurance will no
longer take the form of guaranteed ﬂat premiums in the second period, as is the case when the
settlement market does not exist; instead, the long-term contract now offers partial reclassiﬁcation
risk insurance in the form of premium discounts relative to the spot market premium. Figure 2
depicts the qualitative features of the second-period premium ﬁle Qs
2 (p2): Of course, the health
states for which such partial reclassiﬁcation risk insurance will be provided, i.e., the set NBs, may
be different from the set NB that is relevant for the case without secondary market.
We now provide some comparative statics results with the settlement market.
14Proposition 4. If q > ^ q then Qs
1  ^ Qs
1 where Qs
1 and ^ Qs
1 are respectively the equilibrium period-one
premium for q and ^ q:
Proposition 4 tells us that the higher the probability that the consumers may lose bequest mo-
tives, the lower is the ﬁrst-period premium. At a ﬁrst glance, this seems to be just an analog of
Proposition 2 for the case without the settlement market, but this analogy is misleading. When
there is no settlement market, a higher q directly increases the probability of lapsation and thus
lowers the probability that the insurance company has to pay the death beneﬁts in period 2. The
primary insurance companies under competition will thus lower ﬁrst period premiums (i.e., lower
front-loading) and lower p
2 (i.e. offer more dynamic insurance), as shown in Proposition 2. Notice
that lower front-loading can be compatible with more dynamic insurance when there is no settle-
ment market because offering more dynamic insurance (i.e. lowering p
2) can still be less costly if
more of these contracts will lapse (and hence no death beneﬁt payments are necessary) as a result
of a higher q:
The presence of the settlement market, however, ensures that the primary insurer will not be
able avoid paying death beneﬁts even when the policyholder loses her bequest motive. Thus
the comparative statics result reported in Proposition 4 does not result from the direct effect that a
higher q reduces the probability of paying out death beneﬁts. It instead arises because the nature of
the dynamic insurance in equilibrium is fundamentally changed: it is now in the form of premium
discounts instead of ﬂat premiums,as proved in proposition 3. Offering premium discounts is a
less costly way of providing dynamic insurance than offering ﬂat premiums, which allows the
primary insurers to lower the ﬁrst period premium.
Another useful piece of intuition to explain both Propositions 2 and 4 is that the demand for
consumption smoothing increases when q gets higher. Speciﬁcally, as q gets higher, it becomes
more likely for the policyholder to be in period 2 with high income and no bequest motive. As
such, they would prefer to transfer income from this period-2 state to the ﬁrst period, where
income is lower, if they could. This transfer occurs indirectly through lower ﬁrst period premiums
when q is higher.
An important difference in terms of comparative statics results with respect to q between the
cases with and without the settlement market is in how q affects p
2 and ps
2 : Proposition 2 tells us
that when there is no settlement market, the insurance companies will respond to a higher q by
lowering the ﬁrst period premium and increasing dynamic insurance (i.e. a lower p
2): With the
settlement market, we already showed that the primary insurers will also respond to a higher q by
lowering the ﬁrst period premium, but it is no longer clear that ps
2 is also lowered. Indeed, a more
plausible conjecture would be that ps
2 increases with q. The intuition is that when the period-one
premium is lowered, the zero-proﬁt condition would require that the primary insurers offer less
15insurance (here, again, note importantly that a higher q does not allow the primary insurers to pay
less death beneﬁts when there is settlement market). This intuition is complicated, however, by
the fact that the shape of Qs
2 () itself may be affected by q, as shown in Figure 2, and the ﬁrst order
conditions (18a)-(18d). At a global level, we must expect to see a decline of ps
2 as q decreases from
very large values to small values.21 However, at a local level, without further assumptions, we are
unable to prove that an increase in ps
2 lowers the second-period loss for the primary insurers.
Wealsostateasimplecomparativestaticsresultintermsofconsumerwelfarewithrespectto;
the parameter that measures the competitiveness or the efﬁciency (i.e. loadings) of the settlement
market. The result follows from the envelope theorem after recognizing that, in the optimization
problem given by (15)-(17), the parameter  only appears in the objective function.
Proposition 5. An increase in  increases consumer welfare.
The effect of  on the structure of equilibrium contracts is much harder to establish. The com-
plication is similar to what we described above related to the effect of q, in that a change in  can
potentially affect the shape of Qs
2 ():
3.2 Welfare Effects of the Settlement Market
In this section, we describe the effects of the settlement market on consumer welfare. We ﬁrst
consider a limiting result to demonstrate a potentially stark effect of the secondary market on the
extent to which reclassiﬁcation risk insurance can be achieved by the primary insurers.
Proposition 6. (Potential for Unraveling) Fix u(;);v ();y and (): There is a threshold ^ q > 0 such
that if q > ^ q, then NBs = ; for any g; that is, the equilibrium contract is the set of spot market contracts
for all period-2 health states.
Proposition 6 shows that in the presence of the life settlement market, the primary life insur-
ance market can no longer offer any dynamic reclassiﬁcation risk insurance for any level of g;
when q is sufﬁciently large. This result provides a stark contrast to Claim (3) in Proposition 1
which states that, without life settlement, the equilibrium contract offered by life insurance com-
panies must involve some degree of reclassiﬁcation risk insurance when g is sufﬁciently small for
any q < 1: Proposition 6 thus tells us that settlement market may lead to the unraveling of the
capacity of primary life insurance market to offer dynamic reclassiﬁcation risk insurance.
Note that Proposition 6 provides a clear welfare ranking of the equilibria with and without
the settlement market for environments with small g and large q : without the settlement market,
21For sufﬁciently large values of q, Proposition 6 below shows that the settlement market unravels reclassiﬁcation
risk insurance, and thus p
s






16when g is small and q is large, the equilibrium contracts must offer dynamic reclassiﬁcation risk
insurance; with the settlement market, the equilibrium insurance contracts must be spot contracts.
Thus the settlement market reduces consumer welfare when g is small and q is large.
Our next proposition shows that the same welfare ranking between the cases with and without
a settlement market holds more generally, even when reclassiﬁcation risk insurance is offered in
both environments.
Proposition 7. (Welfare Effects of the Secondary Market) Consumer welfare is reduced by the presence
of a life settlement market.
The argument we use in proving Proposition 7 is as follows: for any contract that is feasible –
including the equilibrium contract – with a secondary market, we show that there exist a feasible
contract without the secondary market. The constructed contract for the no settlement market case
offers identical coverage as the original contract for the settlement market case, except at a lower
ﬁrst-period premium, which is made possible by lapsation pricing. We show that consumers are
weakly better off under the constructed contract.
Proposition 7 formalizes an intuitive argument provided in Claim 3 of Proposition 2 in Daily,
Hendel and Lizzeri (2008). They argued that the settlement market effectively transfers resources
from period 1 when income is relatively low to period 2 when income is relatively high in the
event of losing bequest motive. Such transfers, due to concavity of the utility function, are wel-
fare reducing. The informal argument provided in their paper hinges on the hypothesis that the
ﬁrst-period equilibrium premium in the primary market is higher with the settlement market than
without. This hypothesis does not hold in general. An extreme example of this is provided al-
ready in Proposition 6. When q is sufﬁciently large, Proposition 6 establishes that the primary
insurance market can not offer any dynamic insurance, which implies that the ﬁrst period pre-
mium is Qs
1 = QFI
1 ; the actuarially fair premium. In contrast, when g is small, Proposition 1 tells
us that without the settlement market there will be dynamic insurance, implying that the ﬁrst pe-
riod premium Q1 > QFI
1 because of front-loading. Thus, for sufﬁciently large q and small g; the
ﬁrst-period equilibrium premium in the primary market is lower with the settlement market than
without. Our proof does not rely on such cross-regime comparisons of ﬁrst-period equilibrium
premiums. Even though the ﬁrst period equilibrium premium may be lower with the settlement
market than without the settlement market, the reduction in ﬁrst period premium occurs only by
forgoing potentially welfare enhancing reclassiﬁcation risk insurance.
Many would consider the emergence of the settlement ﬁrms as a form of market completion
(e.g., Doherty and Singer (2002)). After all, consumers who lose their bequest motives in period 2
can share the surplus in the actuarial value of their policy with the settlement ﬁrm, something they
could not do when there is no settlement market. So on a ﬁrst glance, the welfare result in Propo-
17sition 7 is somewhat counter-intuitive. However, from the classical Lipsey and Lancaster (1956),
we know that, loosely, once we depart from complete markets (or all the conditions required for
the optimality of equilibrium), it is possible that the next-best solution may not be the one with
the least degree of market incompleteness. Because the market incompleteness due to the lack of
commitment is present with or without the settlement ﬁrms, we are in a second-best world.22
Another intuition that may be useful for understanding the welfare result is the following. The
settlement market allows policyholders access to the actuarial value in their policies, and thus may
be interpreted as contributing to market completeness. At the same time, however, the settlement
market weakens the consumer’s ability to commit to not asking for a return of their front loaded
premiums in the event that they lose their bequest motive. This weakening of the consumers’
commitment power can be interpreted as contributing further to market incompleteness.
4 Endogenous Cash Surrender Values
So far, we have assumed that the response of the primary market to settlement ﬁrms is re-




2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi: It is possible
that, facingthethreatfromthelifesettlementmarket, theprimaryinsurersmaystarttoenrichtheir
contracts by specifying endogenously chosen cash surrender values (CSV). We distinguish two possi-
bilities of cash surrender values depending on whether they could be contingent on the health
of the policyholder at the time she surrenders the policy to the primary insurer. The categories
of market regimes we consider in this section, deﬁned by the combination of whether there is a
settlement market and what type of CSVs are allowed in the contract, are summarized in Table
1. The case of non-health contingent CSVs is interesting for at least two reasons. First and fore-
most, current U.S. regulations allows life insurance companies to offer CSVs that depend on the
tenureofthepolicy, butprohibitsthemfromofferinghealth-contingentCSVs(see, e.g., Gilbertand
Schultz (1994, Chapter 6)). In fact, currently almost all term life insurance policies have zero CSVs
and most whole life insurance policies have very low and non-health-contingent CSVs. Second,
health-contingent CSVs may not be easy to enforce.
Inthissection, weﬁrststudythecaseinwhichtheprimaryinsurerscanspecifyhealth-contingent
CSVs in the life insurance contracts of the form h(Q1;F1);f(Q2(p2);F2(p2);S (p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi
where the additional termS (p2) speciﬁes the cash surrender value a policyholder can receive from
the primary insurer if she surrenders the contract when her period-2 health status is p2: Notice that
by paying S (p2); the primary insurer can avoid paying the death beneﬁt, but does not receive the
premium payment in period-2. This is signiﬁcantly different from when the policyholder sells the
22For example, Levin (2001) showed that in an Akerlof lemons model, greater information asymmetries between the







No A A’ A” Settlement
Market
Yes B C D
Table 1: Categorization of Market Regimes.
contract to the settlement market, in which case the primary insurer still receives payment of the
period-2 premium, but remains responsible for paying the death beneﬁts. We show in Section 4.1
that in the absence of the settlement market, the option of specifying health-contingent CSVs will
not be exercised in equilibrium by the life insurance companies. We thus immediately know that
the equilibrium contracts and equilibrium consumer welfare under regimes A, A’ and A” will be
identical. We then show in Section ?? that under regime D, when there is a settlement market
and when the primary insurers are allowed to enrich their contracts by offering health-contingent
CSVs, the consumer welfare will be improved relative to that under regime B, but still lower than
that under regime A. In Section 4.3, we study regime C where there is a settlement market and the
primary insurers are restricted to specify only non-health contingent CSVs. We prove a surprising
result that, if restricted to non-health contingent CSVs, the primary insurers will offer zero CSV in
equilibrium, and thus the consumer welfare and equilibrium contract are identical to those under
regime B.
4.1 Endogenous Cash Surrender Values Without a Secondary Market
As a benchmark, we here show that, in the absence of a life settlement market, the consumers
will optimally choose to set S (p2) = 0 when the feasible contract space is enriched to include
health contingent CSVs (regime A’).
The competitive insurance companies under this regime will choose a long-term contract in
the form of h(Q1;F1);f(Q2(p2);F2(p2);S (p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi to solve:
19maxu(y   g   Q1) + p1v(F1) (24)


















s.t. Q1   p1F1 + (1   p1)
Z
f(1   q)[Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)]   qS(p2)gd(p2) = 0; (25)
Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)  0 for all p2; (26)
S(p2)  0 for all p2; (27)
where (25) is the zero-proﬁt constraint reﬂecting the competitive nature of the primary insurance
market, (26) is again the no-lapsation constraint, and (27) is simply the constraint that the CSV
can not be negative because consumers can not commit to contracts requiring them to pay the
insurance company at termination. The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimum with respect to
Q1;F1;Q2 (p2);F2 (p2) and S (p2) are respectively:
u0(y   g   Q1) =  (28a)
v0(F1) =  (28b)
u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
(28c)
v0(F2(p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
(28d)




where, as in Section 2,  and (p2) are respectively the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (25)
and (26), and (p2) is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (27).
It is easy to see that (27) must bind, i.e. S (p2) = 0; for all p2 If it were slack for some p2 2 [0;1],
then for such p2, we will have (p2) = 0; then the ﬁrst order conditions (28a) and (28e) would
immediatelyimplythatu0(y+g+S(p2)) = u0(y g Q1), whichisimpossible. Wecanthusconclude
that, without a secondary market, the primary insurance companies will choose in equilibrium
not to include a health-contingent CSV option in their long-term contract. The proposition below
summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 8. In the absence of a settlement market, the option to include surrender values in long-term
contracts will not be used by the life insurance companies. Thus equilibrium contracts and outcomes for the
consumers will be identical regardless of whether health-contingent CSVs are allowed.
20Proposition 8 is consistent with the observation that term life insurance products indeed do not
carry any cash surrender value. Whole Life insurance policies, as we mentioned in the introduc-
tion, often do specify a low amount of cash surrender value if the policyholder cancels the policy
prior to death. The industry has typically advertised the cash surrender value option as a redemp-
tion of front-loaded premium payments, even though many industry analysts disagree and think
that it should be better interpreted as a saving instrument that exploits the tax advantages of life
insurance payouts (see, e.g., Gilbert and Schultz (1994, Chapter 6)). Proposition 8 suggests the lat-
ter interpretation is more appropriate; in the absence of threats from secondary market, it would
have been efﬁcient not to specify any cash surrender value in a pure life insurance contract.
It is interesting to note that Proposition 7 can be seen as a corollary of Proposition 8 and Propo-
sition 5. To see this, note that when  = 1; problem (15) is a special case of problem (24) by
restricting S (p2) = V s
2 (p2) for all p2: Thus the consumer welfare at the optimum of problem (24),
and thus by Proposition 8 the consumer welfare under regime A as well, is at least as high as
that of problem (15), even when  = 1: But from Proposition 5, the consumer welfare is actually
highest when  = 1 for regime B. Thus consumer welfare is always higher under regime A than
under regime B for all  2 (0;1]; which is precisely what Proposition 7 states.
4.2 Endogenous Health-Contingent Cash Surrender Values with a Settlement
Market
Now we consider equilibrium contracts with health-contingent surrender values in the pres-
ence of a settlement market. The key difference from problem (24) above is that the cash sur-
render value now must be no less than what the policyholder could obtain from the settlement
market, while in problem (24) S (p2) needs to be no less than 0: Denote the equilibrium contract
with a settlement market and endogenous CSVs with the superscript ss. The competitive insur-




2 (p2);Sss (p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi to
solve:
maxu(y   g   Qss
1 ) + p1v(Fss
1 ) (29)






















1 + (1   p1)
Z
f(1   q)[Qss
2 (p2)   p2Fss
2 (p2)]   qSss(p2)gd(p2) = 0 (30)
Qss
2 (p2)   p2Fss
2 (p2)  0 for all p2; (31)
 [p2Fss
2 (p2)   Qss
2 (p2)]   Sss(p2)  0 for all p2; (32)
21where constraint (32) reﬂects the requirement that the endogenous CSV must be at least as high
as what the policyholder can obtain from the settlement ﬁrms, i.e.,  [p2Fss
2 (p2)   Qss
2 (p2)]:23 The
insurance company will never set the cash surrender value to be lower than what could be ob-
tained on the secondary market because by offering just an " more, the insurance company can
repurchase the policy for V ss
2 (p2)+". This is preferred to letting the policy sold on the settlement
market, in which case the insurance compnay is liable for V ss
2 (p2).
Arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 8 above show that:
Lemma 5. In the presence of a secondary market, health-contingent cash surrender values Sss (p2) will be
optimally chosen to be equal to the amount that can be obtained from the secondary market.
Arguments analogous to those used in the proof of Lemmas 3 and 4 can be easily adapted to
show that there exists a threshold period-2 health state pss
2 above which second period premiums
are actuarially favorable; moreover at pss
2 ; the equilibrium contract must satisfy conditions anal-
ogous to those of Lemma 4.24 Thus, the equilibrium contracts with endogenous health-contingent
CSVs and the settlement market (i.e. regime D) are qualitatively similar to the case of settlement
marketwithoutCSVs(i.e. regimeB).However, asweemphasizedearlier, eventhoughtheprimary
insurance companies would have to offer cash surrender values that exactly match the secondary
market, their payoffs are fundamentally different depending on whether the primary insurers are
offering endogenously chosen CSVs. When Sss (p2) is endogenously chosen, once a consumer
with health state p2 loses bequest motive, she will surrender her policy to the primary insurance
company in exchange for CSV Sss (p2); but the insurance company does not receive further pre-
mium payment Qss
2 (p2) and would not have to pay out death beneﬁts Fss (p2): When there are no
CSVs, the primary insurer will continue to receive premium payments from the settlement ﬁrm,
but will have to pay the death beneﬁt. It is a priori not clear how the endogenous CSV will affect
the quantitative features of the contracts. The following proposition, however, shows that in the
presence of the settlement market, the option of endogenously choosing health-contingent cash
surrender values will lower the period-2 health threshold above which partial reclassiﬁcation risk
insurance is provided by the dynamic contract:




2 are respectively the
period-2 health state thresholds above which reclassiﬁcation risk insurance is provided under regimes D and
B respectively.
The intuition for Proposition 9 is quite simple. When primary insurers are allowed to offer
health-contingent CSVs, they will choose the CSVs Sss (p2) to preempt the settlement ﬁrms, which
23We omit another constraint for no-lapsation: S
ss (p2)  V
ss
2 (p2)  p2F
ss
2 (p2)   Q
ss
2 (p2) in the formulation of the
problem. Lemma 5 below ensures that this constraint never binds and thus the solution to the problem is not affected
by the omission.
24The formal statement of this result and its proof are omitted for brevity.
22prevents the settlement ﬁrms from receiving part of the actuarial value V ss
2 (p2): This in turns
allows the primary insurers to offer reclassiﬁcation risk insurance for a wider range of period-2
types.
In terms of equilibrium consumer welfare, we have the following unambiguous ranking across
regimes:
Proposition 10. When there is the settlement market, equilibrium consumer welfare is higher (strictly
higher if  < 1) when life insurance companies can offer health-contingent CSVs (regime D) than when
they are not allowed to offer CSVs (regime B).
Proposition 11. Equilibrium consumer welfare is lower when there is a settlement market than when
there is no settlement market (regime A, A’ or A”) even if endogenous health-contingent CSVs are allowed
(regime D).
The arguments used in the proofs of both Propositions 10 and 11 are similar to that for Propo-
sition 7: for any contract that is feasible under the “dominated” regime (regime B in Proposition
10 and regime D in Proposition 11), we construct a feasible contract under the “dominant” regime
(regime D in Proposition 10 and regime A in Proposition 11) which offers identical coverage as the
original contract for the “dominated” regime, except for a lower ﬁrst-period premium. We show
that consumers are weakly better off under the constructed contract.
4.3 Non-Health Contingent CSV with the Settlement Market
Finally, we consider regime C where primary life insurers are only allowed to offer non-health
contingent CSVs in the presence of life settlement ﬁrms. That is, we consider a contract space in
the form of h(Q1;F1);f(Q2(p2);F2(p2);S) : p2 2 [0;1]gi where S denotes a non-health-contingent
CSV. As we mentioned earlier, the restrictions on CSV to be non-health contingent could result
from explicit government regulations or from the difﬁculties in enforcing contracts with health-
contingent CSVs. We ﬁrst state an immediate corollary of Proposition 8:
Corollary 1 (of Proposition 8). In the absence of the settlement market, the primary insurance companies
will set S = 0 when they are restricted to offer only non-heath contingent CSV.
When the primary insurance companies face the threat from the settlement market, but are
restricted to react to the threat by offering a non-health contingent CSV, they will choose a contract
23in the form of h(Q1;F1);f(Q2(p2);F2(p2);S) : p2 2 [0;1]gi to solve:
maxu(y   g   Q1) + p1v(F1) + (1   p1)(1   q)
Z 1
0
[u(y + g   Q2(p2)) + p2v(F2(p2))]d(p2)
+ (1   p1)q
Z
SV2(p2)
u(y + g + S)d(p2) (33)
+ (1   p1)q
Z
S<V2(p2)
u(y + g + V2(p2))d(p2)
s.t. V2(p2)  S; for all p2; (34)
S  0; (35)
Q1   p1F1 = (1   p1)(1   q)
Z 1
0








where as before V2 (p2)  p2F2 (p2)   Q2 (p2) denotes the actuarial value of the policy at period-2
heath state p2: To understand the above problem, let us ﬁrst explain the constraints. Constraint
(34) is the analog of the no-lapsation constraint in this setting, which requires that the actuarial
value of the contract terms for any period-2 health state be at least equal to the CSV. As before,
this requirement reﬂects the consumer’s inability to commit: if the actuarial value of the contract
was less than the CSV, the consumer would simply surrender the contract and repurchase better
insurance on the spot market. Constraint (35) requires that the CSV S be non-negative to reﬂect
the consumer’s inability to commit to a negative payout in any state. Constraint (36) is the zero-
proﬁt condition reﬂecting competitiveness of the primary market. The ﬁrst integral in the right
hand side of (36) is the expected loss the insurance company suffers from consumers who retain
their bequest motive. Constraint (34) implies that for these consumers, the insurance company’s
expected period-2 loss is always equal to V2(p2): The second integral in the right hand of (36) is the
expected loss the insurance company suffers from consumers who lose their bequest motive and
ﬁnd it optimal to surrender the policy back to the original insurer (for any of such consumers the
insurancecompany’speriod-2lossisS). Thethirdintegralistheexpectedperiod-2losstheinsurer
suffers from consumers who lose their bequest motive but ﬁnd it optimal to sell the policy on the
secondary market (for a consumer in this category with health state p2; the expected period-2 loss
is V2 (p2) for the insurance company).
Now let us explain the objective function. The ﬁrst integral in (33) is the expected second
period utility to consumers with a bequest motive, for whom constraint (34) ensures that they
remain with the original contract terms; the second integral is the expected second period utility












Figure 3: The Effect of Increasing S by  > 0 on Primary Insurer’s Period-2 Proﬁt.
to the insurance company for CSV S; the third integral is the expected second period utility for
consumers without bequest motive who ﬁnd it optimal to sell their contract on the settlement
market for payment of V2 (p2):
Note that problem (33) is substantially more complicated than problem (29) because now the
policyholders who lose bequest motives need to choose whether to sell the policy to the primary
insurer or the settlement ﬁrms. However, using a rather intuitive perturbation argument we can
prove the following somewhat surprising result:
Proposition 12. In the presence of a settlement market, if the primary insurers are restricted to offer only
non-health contingent CSVs, they will choose S = 0 in equilibrium.
To understand the intuition for Proposition 12, it is useful to consider the effect of raising S
from 0 to " on the ﬁrm’s second period proﬁts. In Figure 3, the curve labelled V2 (p2) depicts
the period-2 actuarial value of the primary insurer’s long-term policy at health state p2, and the
curve labelled V2 (p2) is the settlement ﬁrm’s payment for such policies. If the primary insurer
raises the non-health contingent CSV S from 0 to "; policyholders with period 2 health in region
A who no longer have a bequest motive will surrender their policies to the primary insurer for
a payment of " > V2 (p2): The area labeled A captures the loss in proﬁt from such a change
in the sense that the ﬁrm will be paying these consumers " under such a change, whereas they
would have would have cost the primary insurer V2 (p2), which is less than "; before the change.
Policyholders who no longer have bequest motives but with period-2 health state in the region B
will also decide to surrender their policy to the primary insurer instead of selling them to the life
settlement ﬁrms because V2 (p2) < ". For these policyholders the primary insurers were losing
25V2 (p2) before the change, and now are losing only ": Since V2 (p2) > " for these policyholders,
area B then represents the gain for the primary insurer’s proﬁt from increasing S from 0 to ":25
As is clear from the graph, area A is ﬁrst-order proportional to "; while Area B is second-order
proportional to ": When " is small, the ﬁrm’s second period losses increase as a result of increasing
S from 0 to ": As a result, the insurance company has to increase the ﬁrst period premium Q1 to
maintain zero proﬁt. It is easy to see that the utility cost of increasing the ﬁrst period premium is
exactly   u0 (y   g   Q
1): It turns out that the utility gain for the consumer when S increases
from 0 to " is captured by (1 p1)qu0(y +g)(^ p2) where ^ p2 is deﬁned by V2 (^ p2) = ": The marginal
utility gain in the second period is thus smaller than the marginal loss from the increase in the ﬁrst
period premium, and so this tradeoff is welfare reducing. Similar perturbation argument can be
used to show that marginally decreasing S from any positive level is always welfare improving.
Thus the optimal S = 0:
Proposition 12 tells us that when primary insurance companies are restricted to respond to the
threat of the settlement market by optimally choosing non-health contingent CSVs, such an option
is essentially useless. Thus the consumer welfare in regime C is exactly the same as in regime B.




categorized in Table 1. Proposition 8 and its Corollary 2 imply that when there is no settlement
market, the equilibrium consumer welfare does not depend on whether endogenous cash surren-
der values are available to the primary insurer. Thus consumer welfare is the same under regimes
A, A’ and A”. Proposition 11 shows that consumer welfare is lower under regime D (with settle-
ment market and endogenous health-contingent CSVs) than regimes A (and A’, A”). Proposition
12 and its Corollary 2 show that consumer welfare is the same under regimes B and C. Finally,
Proposition 10 shows that consumer welfare is higher under regime D than regime B (and thus
C). Table 2 thus summarizes our overall ﬁnding that the presence of settlement market unam-
biguously lowers the equilibrium consumer welfare in our environment, irrespective of what the
primary insurers are allowed to do in response to the settlement ﬁrms. In particular, restricting
the primary insurers’ CSVs to be non-health contingent is undesirable for consumers.








No A = A’ = A”
Settlement
Market Y
Yes B = C  D
Table 2: Comparison of Consumer Welfare Across Market Regimes: A Summary.
Note: The two weak inequalities are strict when  is strictly less than 1.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we have examined in detail the effect of the life settlement market on the struc-
ture of the long term contracts offered by the primary insurance market, as well as the effect of
the life settlement market on consumer welfare, using a dynamic model of life insurance with
one sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation ( ` a la Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) and Daily,
Hendel and Lizzeri (2008)). We show that the presence of the life settlement market affects the
extent as well as the form of dynamic reclassiﬁcation risk insurance in the equilibrium of the pri-
mary insurance market. In the absence of a life settlement market, reclassiﬁcation risk insurance is
provided through actuarially favorable level premiums for individuals with second period health
state worse than a threshold p
2. In contrast, when there is a secondary market, reclassiﬁcation risk
is provided through premium discounts (relative to the actuarially fair premium) for individuals
whose health is worse than a threshold ps
2 . Moreover, ps
2 may be different from p
2, so reclas-
siﬁcation risk insurance may be provided for a smaller set of health realizations when there is a
secondary market. We show that in general, the settlement market always leads to worse con-
sumer welfare than when there is no secondary market (Proposition 7). In the most extreme form,
the presence of the settlement market can completely unravel the dynamic contracts to a sequence
of short-term spot contracts with no dynamic risk classiﬁcation risk insurance at all (Proposition
6).
We also examine the primary insurers’ response to the settlement market when they can offer
enriched contracts by specifying optimally chosen cash surrender values. We show that when
there are no settlement ﬁrms, the primary insurers will not exercise the option of specifying CSVs;
but when there is a threat from settlement ﬁrms, primary insurers will choose CSVs to preempt
the settlement market. Allowing for optimally chosen CSVs improves consumer welfare, but con-
sumers are still worse off than if there was no secondary market. We also showed that the option
27of primary insurers to endogenously choose the CSV is useless if the CSVs are restricted to be
non-health contingent as required by the current regulation. However, if CSVs can be health-
contingent, then the primary insurance companies can partially mitigate the welfare losses in-
duced by the emergence of the settlement market (see Table 2).
Directions for Future Research. There are several important venues for further research. First,
this paper, as well as Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008), studies the effects of life settlement mar-
kets when life insurance policy lapsation is driven only by the loss of bequest motives. Selling of
life insurance policies could, however, be a result of large income losses (or equivalently expense
increase), as is the case for the viatical market for AIDS patients, as well as the story reported in
the Wall Street Journal. In a companion paper, Fang and Kung (2010a), we consider a model of
life insurance market that explicitly features both income and mortality risks and examine the ef-
fects of life settlement market on consumer welfare when policyholders’ lapsation could be driven
by income shocks. The life settlement market allows life insurance policies to be used as an in-
strument for consumption smoothing when the policyholder experiences a large negative income
shock. Because payments received from life settlement ﬁrms (or from cash surrender values of the
primary insurer) in such low income states have a large marginal value, the life settlement market
can indeed make consumers better off. We also ﬁnd that, when lapsations are driven by income
shocks, the welfare effects of the settlement market depend on what other consumption smooth-
ing instruments are available to the consumers, and whether they are allowed to hold multiple
policies.
The theoretical analysis thus establishes that the welfare effects of life settlement market de-
pends on why policyholders lapse. If policyholders lapse only because of their loss of bequest
motives, then we have shown in this paper that the settlement market is bad for consumers. How-
ever, if lapsations are driven by income shocks, then our companion paper Fang and Kung (2010a)
shows that settlement market may improve consumer welfare. Therefore, it is crucially important
to empirically understand why policyholders lapse their policies. Surprisingly, to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no formal empirical analysis of this issue in the literature. In Fang and
Kung (2010b), we use data from the HRS to estimate a dynamic structural model of life insurance
purchase, renewal, and lapsation. We then use these estimates to disentangle the contributions of
health shocks, income shocks and bequest motive shocks to the observed lapsation of life insur-
ance policies.
It is also interesting to empirically test the models’ predictions of how the primary insurance
market responds to the threat from the settlement market. For example, Proposition 3 showed
that level term life insurance policies are no longer optimal. Propositions 10 and 12 showed that
primary insurers should have incentives to offer health-contingent CSVs in response to the set-
28tlement market, but a non-health contingent CSV is of no use. Do we see these developments in
the primary market? It is also interesting to examine the model’s prediction of who will sell life
insurance to the settlement ﬁrms. For example, in the current model, only those with no bequest
motives but with bad health (whose original life insurance policy has strictly positive actuarial
value) will sell to settlement ﬁrms. Does the evidence support this prediction?
References
Chandik, Mark, “The Growing Life Settlement Industry: Is Anyone Watch-
ing Out for Consumers?,” Testimony presented at the California Senate Bank-
ing, Finance and Insurance Committee on Life Settlements, 2008, available at
http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/sen/committee/standing/banking/info hearings/backgrounds/2-
20-08 life settlement background.
Daily, Glenn, “Lapse-supported Pricing: Is It Worth the Risks?,” Glenndaily.com Information Ser-
vices, Inc., 2004.
, Igal Hendel, and Alessandro Lizzeri, “Does the Secondary Life Insurance Market Threaten
Dynamic Insurance?,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2008, 98 (2), 151–156.
Deloitte Report, “The Life Settlement Market: An Actuarial Perspective on Consumer Economic
Value,” 2005.
Doherty, Neil A. and Hal J. Singer, “The Beneﬁts of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance Poli-
cies,” Working Paper, Wharton Financial Institute Center, University of Pennsylvania, 2002.
Fang, Hanming and Edward Kung, “The Welfare Effect of Life Settlement Market: The Case of
Income Shocks,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania and Duke University, 2010a.
and , “Why Do Life Insurance Policyholders Lapse? Liquidity Shocks vs. Loss of Bequest
Motives,” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania and Duke University, 2010b.
Gilbert, Jersey and Ellen Schultz, Consumer Reports Life Insurance Handbook, Consumer Reports
Books: Yonkers, NY, 1994.
Hendel, Igal and Alessandro Lizzeri, “Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets,” American
Economic Review, 1999, 89 (6), 1097–1115.
and , “The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118 (1), 299–327.
29House, Christopher L. and John V. Leahy, “An sS Model with Adverse Selection,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 2004, 112 (3), 581–614.
Levin, Jonathan, “Information and the Market for Lemons,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 2001,
32 (4), 657–666.
Life Insurance Settlement Association, “Data Collection Report, 2004-2005,” 2006.
Lipsey, Richard G and Kevin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 1956, 24 (1), 11–32.
Singer, Hal J. and Eric Stallard, “Reply to ‘The Life Settlement Market: An Actuarial Perspective
on Consumer Economic Value’,” Criterion Economics L.L.C., 2005.
Stolyarov, Dmitriy, “Turnover of Used Durables in a Stationary Equilibrium: Are Older Goods
Traded More?,” Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110 (4), 1390–1413.
Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. If p2 2 B and p0
2 2 NB, the complementary slackness conditions (5) implies that (p2)  0
and (p0
2) = 0. First order conditions (4c) for Q2 (p2) and Q2 (p0
2) and p0 then imply:










Since u0 is decreasing, it must be that Q2(p2)  Q2(p0
2). The full event insurance conditions (6a)
and (6b) then imply that F2 (p2)  F2 (p0
2):
To prove that p2 < p0
2; suppose to the contrary. Since p0









where the last inequality follows from postulated p2  p0
2, and the fact that F2 (p2)  F2 (p0
2)
established above. Thus, Q2(p2) < p2F2(p2); a contradiction to p2 2 B.




2). Since hQ2 (p
2);F2 (p
2)i must satisfy the full-event insurance
condition (6b), we have F2 (p
2) > FFI
2 (p
2): Thus, Q2 (p
2)   p
2F2 (p
2) < 0; hence p
2 2 NB. There-
fore, (p
2) = 0 and thus the ﬁrst order conditions (4) imply that
u0(y + g   Q2(p
2)) = u0(y   g   Q1): (A1)
But for all p2 < p
2, we already established that Q2(p2) = QFI




u0(y + g   Q2(p2)) = u0(y + g   QFI
2 (p
2))  u0(y   g   Q1): (A2)
(A1) and (A2) imply that u0(y + g   QFI
2 (p






To prove (12), suppose instead u0(y +g  QFI
2 (p
2)) < u0(y  g  Q1). Because QFI
2 () is contin-
uous, there must exist ^ p2 > p
2 such that u0(y + g   QFI
2 (^ p2)) < u0(y   g   Q1). Since by Lemma
1, ^ p2 2 NB, it must be that Q2(^ p2) < QFI
2 (^ p2). Thus u0(y + g   Q2(^ p2)) < u0(y + g   QFI
2 (^ p2)) <
u0(y   g   Q1), a contradiction to ^ p2 2 NB.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Let ^ q > q and suppose ^ Q1  Q1. Then the concavity of u implies that u0(y   g   ^ Q1) 
u0(y   g   Q1). Lemma 2 then implies that:26
u0(y + g   QFI
2 (^ p




2 () is increasing in its argument, we thus have ^ p
2  p. This in turn implies that ^ Q2(p2) 
Q2(p2) and ^ F2(p2)  F2(p2) for all p2. Hence 0  ^ Q2 (p2)   p2 ^ F2(p2)  Q2 (p2)   p2F2(p2) for all
p2 2 [0;1]. Hence, if p
2 < 1; we must have:
(1   ^ q)
Z h
^ Q2 (p2)   p2 ^ F2(p2)
i
d(p2) > (1   q)
Z
[p2F2(p2)   Q2 (p2)]d(p2):
The above inequality, together with the postulated ^ Q1  Q1, contradicts the zero proﬁt condition
for both q and ^ q:
26Note that Q
FI
2 () as deﬁned by (7) and (8) does not depend on q:
31Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof. If p2 2 Bs and p0
2 2 NBs; then (p2)  0 and (p0
2) = 0, and V s
2 (p2) = 0 and V s
2 (p0
2) > 0:
The ﬁrst order conditions (18c) corresponding to heath states p2 and p0
2 imply that
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) + qu0(y + g)  (1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p0
2)) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (p0
2)):
Since u0(y + g) > u0(y + g + V s
2 (p0




To prove that p2 < p0
2; suppose to the contrary that p2  p0
2. Then note that p0















where the last inequality because Fs
2 (p2)  Fs
2 (p0




fact that full-event insurance requires that face amount decreases with premium. Hence Qs
2(p2) <
p2Fs
2(p2); contradicting the assumption that p2 2 Bs.
Proof of Lemma 4:









2 )i must satisfy the full-event insurance condition (21), we have
Fs
2 (ps
2 ) > FFI
2 (ps
2 ): Thus, Qs
2 (ps
2 )   ps
2 Fs
2 (ps
2 ) < 0; hence ps
2 2 NBs. Therefore (ps
2 ) = 0:
Thus the ﬁrst order conditions imply:
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(ps
2 )) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (ps
2 )) = u0(y   g   Qs
1): (A3)
Since Qs
2 (p2) = QFI
2 (p2) for all p2 < ps





2(p2))+qu0(y+g) = (1   q)u0(y+g QFI
2 (ps
2 ))+qu0(y+g)  u0(y g Qs
1):
(A4)
(A3) and (A4) together imply:
(1   q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (ps
2 )) + qu0(y + g)  (1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(ps
2 )) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (ps
2 ));
but this is impossible because we postulated that QFI
2 (ps
2 ) > Qs
2(ps
2 ) and hence V2(ps
2 ) > 0.
To prove (23), we suppose instead that (1   q)u0(y+g QFI
2 (ps
2 ))+qu0(y+g) < u0(y g Qs
1).
32Then there must exist p2 > ps
2 but sufﬁciently close to ps
2 such that:
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (p2)) < u0(y   g   Qs
1);
contradicting that p2 2 NB for all p2 > ps
2 .
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. The ﬁrst assertion directly follows from the fact that p2 2 NBs if p2 > ps
2 : To show that
Qs
2 (p2) increases in p2 for p2 > ps
2 , note that from the ﬁrst order conditions (18), Fs
2 (p2) and
Qs
2 (p2) must satisfy, for all p2 > p
2 the following system:
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (p2)) = u0(y   g   Qs
1);
v0(Fs
2(p2)) = u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2));
V s
2 (p2) = p2Fs
2(p2)   Qs
2(p2):
Taking derivatives with respect to p2 for each equation, we obtain:



















































which is strictly positive if q > 0:
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Qs
1 > ^ Qs
1. Then, u0(y   g   Qs
1) > u0(y   g   ^ Qs
1). Using (23) in
Lemma 4, we have:
(1   q)u0  




+ qu0(y + g) > (1   ^ q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (^ ps
2 )) + ^ qu0(y + g):
33Rearranging the above inequality yields:
(q   ^ q)u0(y + g) > (1   ^ q)u0  




  (1   q)u0  









2 )  QFI
2 (ps
2 );thusu0  










: Thus, (A6) implies that:
 (q   ^ q)u0(y + g) > (q   ^ q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (ps
2 ));
which is impossible when q > ^ q:
Now, suppose, for the second case, that ^ ps
2 < ps
2 : Then there must exist ~ p2 > ps
2 such that
V s
2 (~ p2) = ^ V s
2 (~ p2). Such ~ p2 must exist for the following reasons. If ^ ps
2 < ps
2 , we know that ^ V s
2 (p2) >
V s
2 (p2) for all ^ ps
2 < p2 < ps
2 . The zero-proﬁt conditions together with the postulated Qs
1 > ^ Qs
1





2 (p2)d(p2) > ^ Qs
1   p1 ^ Fs
1 =
R ^ V s
2 (p2)d(p2), hence V s
2 () must
cross ^ V s
2 () at some point ~ p2 > ps
2 . We now argue that V s
2 (~ p2) = ^ V s
2 (~ p2) must imply that Qs
2(~ p2) =
^ Qs
2(~ p2). To see this, note that both hQs
2 (~ p2);Fs
2 (~ p2)i and
D
^ Qs




full-event insurance as deﬁned by (21). That is,
u0 (y + g   Qs













If, moreover, V s
2 (~ p2) = ~ p2Fs
2 (~ p2)   Qs
2 (~ p2) = ~ p2 ^ Fs
2 (~ p2)   ^ Qs
2 (~ p2) = ^ V s
2 (~ p2); then it must be the
case that Qs
2 (~ p2) = ^ Qs
2 (~ p2) and Fs
2 (~ p2) = ^ Fs
2 (~ p2): Thus we have established that there exists
~ p2 > ps
2 > ^ ps
2 such that V s
2 (~ p2) = ^ V s
2 (~ p2) and Qs
2 (~ p2) = ^ Qs
2 (~ p2): Now, from the ﬁrst order
conditions (18), we have that at p2 = ~ p2;
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(~ p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s




y   g   ^ Qs
1

= (1   ^ q)u0(y + g   ^ Qs
2(~ p2)) + ^ qu0(y + g +  ^ V s
2 (~ p2))
= (1   ^ q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(~ p2)) + ^ qu0(y + g + V s
2 (~ p2));
which could not hold if q > ^ q:
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. See discussion in the main text.
34Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. If NBs is not empty, then for any p2 2 NBs; from ﬁrst order conditions (18) the contract
terms must satisfy:
(1   q)u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (p2)) = u0(y   g   Qs
1); (A7)
which can be rewritten as:
(1   q)[u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2))   u0(y + g + V s
2 (p2))] = u0(y   g   Qs
1)   u0(y + g + V s
2 (p2)): (A8)
First note that the zero-proﬁt condition (16) implies that if NBs is not empty, then it must be the
case that Qs
1  QFI
1 > 0, where QFI








are implicitly deﬁned by the unique solution to the following
system of equations:
u0(y   g   QFI








1 does not depend on q; but it is decreasing in g: Let  g be the upper-bound of the
values that g can take, and let QFI
1 > 0 denotes the actuarially fair full-insurance premium at
g =  g: Thus QFI
1  QFI
1 for all g: Therefore the right hand side (RHS) of (A8) is bounded below,
for any g > 0; by:
RHS > u0(y   QFI
1 )   u0 (y):
Now examine the left hand side (LHS) of (A8). We will consider two cases. For the ﬁrst
case, suppose that limx!0 u0(x)  u0 (0) < 1. Because Qs
2 (p2) is always smaller than y + g in
equilibrium, we have that
LHS = u0(y + g   Qs
2(p))   u0(y + g + V s
2 (p)) < u0 (0):
Thus if
q < ^ q =
u0(y   QFI
1 )   u0 (y)
u0(0)
;
then the LHS of (A8) will always be smaller than its RHS; i.e., equation (A7) can never be satisﬁed
for any p2: Thus, NBs must be empty.
For the second case, suppose that limx!0 u0(x) = 1. Since p2 2 NBs, we have p2Fs
2(p2)  
35Qs
2(p2) > 0: Plugging (21) into the above inequality, we obtain:












Notice that the LHS of (A10) is increasing as Qs
2(p2) varies from 0 to y + g, and that its RHS is
decreasing in Qs
2(p2) over the same interval. If u0(y + g)  v0(0) then (A10) cannot be satisﬁed
for any value of Qs
2 (p) and henceNBs must be empty. Thus we can without loss of generality
consider the case that u0(y + g) < v0(0). Since we are now considering the case in which u0 (0) =
1; we know that at Qs
2 (p) = y + g; LHS of (A10) is u0 (0) > v0((y + g)=p2) for all p2: Because
LHS of (A10) is continuous and monotonically increasing in Qs
2 (p2); while the RHS of (A10) is
continuous and monotonically decreasing in Qs
2 (p2); there must exist, for each p2 2 NBs some
x(p2;g) < y+g such that u0(y+g x(p2;g)) = v0(x(p2;g)=p), and hence Qs
2 (p) must be bounded
above by x(p2;g): Moreover, note that, for all g; it can be easily shown that x(p2;g) is increasing
in p2: Thus we can write supp22NBs x(p2;g) = x(1;g)  x(g) < y + g; for all g: Now denote
 u0  maxg u0(y + g   x(g)) < 1. We hence have
u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2))   u0(y + g + V s
2 (p2)) < u0(y + g   Qs
2(p2)) < u0(y + g   x(p2;g))
 u0(y + g   x(g))   u0;
where the second inequality follows from Qs
2 (p2) < x(p2;g); the third inequality follows from
x(p2;g)  x(g); and the last inequality follows from  u0  maxg u0(y + g   x(g)): Thus, if
q < ^ q 
u0(y   QFI
1 )   u0 (y)
 u0 ;
then the LHS of (A8) will always be smaller than its RHS; i.e., equation (A7) can never be satisﬁed
for any p2: Thus, NBs must be empty.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. We will show that for feasible contract for problem (15), we can construct a feasible contract
for problem (1) that which makes the consumers weakly better off.




2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi be a feasible contract for problem (15) when
there is a settlement market. Thus, Qs
1   p1Fs
1 = (1   p1)
R
V s
2 (p2)d(p2); where V s
2 (p2) 
p2Fs
2 (p2)   Qs
2(p2):





2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]g
E
where ^ Q1 is given by:
^ Q1   p1Fs




Since q 2 (0;1); we know that ^ Q1 < Qs
1: That is, ^ C is exactly the same contract as Cs except that
the ﬁrst period premium is decreased from Qs
1 until the zero proﬁt condition for the no-settlement-
market case (2) holds. It is easy to show that ^ C is a feasible contract for problem (1).
We will now show that ^ C in a world without settlement market is better than Cs in a world
with settlement market. To see this, let
Ws (Cs) = p1v(Fs








2(p2)) + u(y + g   Qs
2(p2))]



























denote the expected consumer welfare associated with contract ^ C in a world without the settle-





  Ws (Cs) = u(y   g   ^ Q1)   u(y   g   Qs
1)
  (1   p1)q
Z
[u(y + g + V s
2 (p2))   u(y + g)]d(p2)
 u(y   g   ^ Q1)   u(y   g   Qs
1)









  u(y + g)





















+ (1   q)u(y + g)   u(y + g)
 u






  u(y + g);





  Ws (Cs)  u(y   g   ^ Q1)   u(y   g   Qs
1)









  u(y + g)

First note that Qs
1  ^ Q1 = (1 p1)q
R
V s
2 (p2)d(p2). By the continuous function theorem, we know
that there exists 1 2 (0;1) such that








1   ^ Q1

Qs
1   ^ Q1

:










  u(y + g)




















































1   ^ Q1

 0
where the last inequality will be strict if Qs
1   ^ Q1 is strictly positive, i.e., if there is dynamic reclas-
siﬁcation risk insurance under contract Cs:
Now let Cs be the equilibrium contract in the presence of the settlement market. The above ar-
gument shows that the contract ^ C constructed through a simple reduction of ﬁrst period premium
is feasible for the problem without the settlement market; and ^ C provides weakly (or strictly, if
38Cs offers some dynamic insurance) higher expected utility to the consumers for the case without
settlement market than Cs would provide for consumers with settlement market. Because ^ C is
only a candidate contract for the case without settlement market, the equilibrium contract in that
case must provide no lower expected consumer welfare than ^ C:
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. See discussion in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Proof. The ﬁrst order conditions for the solution to problem (29) are:
u0(y   g   Qss
1 ) =  (A11a)
v0(Fss
1 ) =  (A11b)
u0(y + g   Qss
2 (p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
 
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
(A11c)
v0(Fss
2 (p2)) =  +
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
 
(p2)
(1   p1)(1   q)(p2)
(A11d)




where  (p2) is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (32).
From these conditions, we see that constraint (32) must bind for all p2 because otherwise, (p2)
must be equal to 0; and then (A11a) and (A11e) together would have implied that u0(y + g +
Sss(p2)) = u0(y   g   Qss
1 ), which cannot hold.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. We consider two cases. For the ﬁrst case, suppose that Qs
1  Qss
1 . Then we have, from




1 : From Lemma 5, we know that in
equilibrium Sss (p2) = V ss





(1   q)V ss





39Sotheremustexist ~ p2 suchthatV s
2 (~ p2)  V ss
2 (~ p2)andQs
2(~ p2)  Qss
2 (~ p2). Atsucha ~ p2;thefollowing
must hold:
(1   q)u0(y + g   Q2(~ p2)) + qu0(y + g + V s
2 (~ p2))
 (1   q)u0(y + g   Qss
2 (~ p2)) + qu0(y + g + V ss
2 (~ p2))
Now from the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (15) detailed in (18), the left hand side of the
above inequality is equal to u0(y g Qs
1); and the right hand side, from the ﬁrst order conditions
for problem (29), is large than [(1   q) + q]u0(y   g   Qss
1 ): That is,
u0(y   g   Qs
1)  [(1   q) + q]u0(y   g   Qss
1 ):
Now, Lemma 4 for ps
2 and the analogous lemma for pss
2 imply that:27
(1   q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (ps
2 )) + qu0(y + g)  (1   q)u0(y + g   QFI
2 (pss




For the second case, suppose Qs
1 > Qss
1 . Then:
u0(y   g   Q1) > u0(y   g   Qss
1 )  [(1   q) + q]u0(y   g   Qss
1 ):








2(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi:




1 = ^ Q1;Fs
1);f(Qs
2(p2);Fs
2(p2);Sss (p2) =  [p2Fs
2(p2)   Qs
2(p2)]) : p2 2 [0;1]g
E
;
where ^ Q1 is chosen to satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition (30), i.e.,
^ Q1 = p1Fs
1   (1   p1)
Z
f[(1   q) + q][Qs
2(p2)   p2Fs
2(p2)]gd(p2):
27The analogous lemma for p
ss
2 is omitted from the text for brevity. It states that under regime D, the equilibrium

















2 )) + qu
0(y + g) = [(1   q) + q]u




1 in Cs must satisfy the zero-proﬁt condition (16), which implies that:
Qs
1 = p1Fs





For any  2 (0;1); ^ Q1 < Qs
1: Thus the consumer is strictly better off in regime D with contract ^ Css
than in regime B with the optimal contract Cs:
Proof Proposition 11:





2 (p2);Sss(p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]gi
be the optimal contract with endogenous health-contingent CSVs in the presence of a settlement
market. As Lemma 5 shows, Sss(p2) = V ss
2 (p2)  p2Fss
2 (p2)   Qss













2 (p2)) : p2 2 [0;1]g
E
where ^ Q1 is given by:
^ Q1 = p1Fss




Since q 2 (0;1) and  > 0; we know that ^ Q1 < Qss
1 : That is, ^ C offers exactly the same coverage as
Css, except at a lower ﬁrst period premium. It is easy to see that ^ C is a feasible contract for regime
A (the case without a secondary market), but outside the feasible set for regime D.
We will now show that ^ C in a world without secondary market provides consumers with
higher welfare than Css does in a world with secondary market. To see this, let
Wss (Css) = p1v(Fss
1 ) + u(y   g   Qss
1 )
+ (1   p1)
Z
f(1   q)[p2v(Fss
2 (p2)) + u(y + g   Qss
2 (p2))] + qu(y + g + Sss(p2))gd(p2)






1 ) + u(y   g   ^ Q1)
+ (1   p1)
Z
f(1   q)[p2v(Fss
2 (p2)) + u(y + g   Qss
2 (p2))] + qu(y + g)gd(p2)
41denote the expected consumer welfare associated with contract ^ C in regime A. Note that since
Sss(p2) = V ss






  Wss (Cs)  u(y   g   ^ Q1)   u(y   g   Qss
1 )









  u(y + g)

:
By the continuous function theorem, we know that there exists 1 2 (0;1) such that








1   ^ Q1

Qss
1   ^ Q1

:










  u(y + g)























1   ^ Q1

;
where the last equality follows from Qss



























1   ^ Q1

 0
where the last inequality will be strict if Qss
1   ^ Q1 is strictly positive, i.e., if there is dynamic
reclassiﬁcation risk insurance under contract Css: Since Css is the optimal contract under regime
D and since ^ C is only a feasible contract under regime A, we conclude that equilibrium consumer
welfare must be no lower under regime A than under regime D.
42Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof. The Lagrangian for problem (33) is:
L = u(y   g   Q1) + p1v(F1) + (1   p1)(1   q)
Z 1
0
[u(y + g   Q2(p2)) + pv(F2(p2))]d(p2)
+ (1   p1)q
Z
SV2(p2)
u(y + g + S)d(p2) + (1   p1)q
Z
S<V2(p2)









(Q1   p1F1) + (1   p1)(1   q)
R 1
0 [Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)]d(p2)
 (1   p1)q
R
SV2(p2) Sd(p2) + (1   p1)(1   q)
R





where f(p2)  0 : p2 2 [0;1]g;  0;  0 are respectively the Lagrange multiplier for con-
straints (34), (35), and (36).
Using standard arguments, we can show that under the optimum, V2 () must be continuous
and monotonically increasing in p2, with V2 (p2) > 0 for some p2 if there is some dynamic reclas-
siﬁcation risk insurance in equilibrium. Thus we know that for every S  0 with S sufﬁciently
small, there exists a ^ p2 such that V2 (p2)  S if and only if p2  ^ p2 where V2 (^ p2) = S: Thus from








Therefore, the Lagrangian (A12) can be rewritten as:
L = u(y   g   Q1) + p1v(F1) + (1   p1)(1   q)
Z 1
0
[u(y + g   Q2(p2)) + pv(F2(p2))]d(p2)
+ (1   p1)q
Z ^ p2
0
u(y + g + S)d(p2) + (1   p1)q
Z 1
^ p2









(Q1   p1F1) + (1   p1)(1   q)
R 1
0 [Q2(p2)   p2F2(p2)]d(p2)
 (1   p1)q
R ^ p2
0 Sd(p2) + (1   p1)(1   q)
R 1




Applying the Leibniz rule and (A13), we have that the derivative of the Lagrangian (A14) with
43respect to S, evaluated at the optimum (superscripted by ), is
@L
@S































 (1   p1)q [Q
2(^ p










Since by deﬁnition, V 
2 (^ p
2) = S, (A15) simpliﬁes to:
@L
@S






Term A z }| {
(1   p1)q(^ p
2) +
Term B z }| {









We now argue that @L
@S is strictly negative when S deviates from 0 to a small " > 0: To see this, note
that in the "-neighborhood of S = 0; we have  = 0; lims!"=0+ V 
2 (^ p





= (1   p1)q









2 (0) = lim!!0+ ^ p2 (") and ^ p2 (") solves V2 (^ p2 (")) = ": Note that the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to Q1 implies that u0 (y   g   Q







The same argument can be used to show that if the optimal S was strictly positive, a deviation of
S from S to S   " will be strictly preferred. Thus the optimal S must be equal to 0:
44